Historier fra Center for ledelse i byggeriet
21. september 2009
Silence and Risk Management
Kjell Tryggestad
I will use this occasion to share my thoughts as they emerged under and after the seminar.
First, I was intrigued by the plot in the title of Herve’s presentation, notably his idea that silence about risk and risk management is not the same as absence. How can that be?
To me, this was both a very interesting and novel way of approaching the subject matter of risk. Briefly put, Herve’s answer seems to be that, in practice well functioning risk management can in fact be silent about risk, although in theory this cannot be. I think Herve provided a convincing argument for why standard risk management theory is insufficiently dealing with its own subject matter, and further supported by his longitudinal study of risk management practice in a public transportation company.
As we continued with the discussion some of you asked further questions into the relative absence of a risk vocabulary. As Herve explained to us, the relative absence was uneven distributed in the sense that the private contractors were more prone to use the risk vocabulary than their public client. How can that be?
One possible explanation that I considered is that the private companies are relatively better versed in the modern risk management vocabulary than their public client. But I am not very happy and satisfied with this explanation. First, it just reproduces the old stereotype between a competent and well functioning private sector and a backward public sector. Second and more importantly, and Herve made this clear to us, the public company in his study is well functioning on most accounts.
So, what other possible explanations can there be? I think several of the participants pointed to additional possible explanations as to why the public company is relatively silent when it comes to the use of a risk vocabulary. One possibility that was mentioned (by Peter, and I think some other participants as well) concerned blame games, i.e., the more explicit the risk vocabulary becomes, the more likely it is that it turns into a blame game.
The public company’s regular use of about 90 relatively risk silent contracts might indicate an anticipation of such blame games. But what does the contracts, and their successive elaboration over time (as Herve told us these documents evolve and tends to grow in length over time), further suggests?
I am not at all on any firm ground here, but my hunch is that these contracts, in addition to have a role in everyday tactics and practice, might have a more strategic role to play in framing risks. Can it be so that their relative absence and silence in the contract is calculated?
First, I was intrigued by the plot in the title of Herve’s presentation, notably his idea that silence about risk and risk management is not the same as absence. How can that be?
To me, this was both a very interesting and novel way of approaching the subject matter of risk. Briefly put, Herve’s answer seems to be that, in practice well functioning risk management can in fact be silent about risk, although in theory this cannot be. I think Herve provided a convincing argument for why standard risk management theory is insufficiently dealing with its own subject matter, and further supported by his longitudinal study of risk management practice in a public transportation company.
As we continued with the discussion some of you asked further questions into the relative absence of a risk vocabulary. As Herve explained to us, the relative absence was uneven distributed in the sense that the private contractors were more prone to use the risk vocabulary than their public client. How can that be?
One possible explanation that I considered is that the private companies are relatively better versed in the modern risk management vocabulary than their public client. But I am not very happy and satisfied with this explanation. First, it just reproduces the old stereotype between a competent and well functioning private sector and a backward public sector. Second and more importantly, and Herve made this clear to us, the public company in his study is well functioning on most accounts.
So, what other possible explanations can there be? I think several of the participants pointed to additional possible explanations as to why the public company is relatively silent when it comes to the use of a risk vocabulary. One possibility that was mentioned (by Peter, and I think some other participants as well) concerned blame games, i.e., the more explicit the risk vocabulary becomes, the more likely it is that it turns into a blame game.
The public company’s regular use of about 90 relatively risk silent contracts might indicate an anticipation of such blame games. But what does the contracts, and their successive elaboration over time (as Herve told us these documents evolve and tends to grow in length over time), further suggests?
I am not at all on any firm ground here, but my hunch is that these contracts, in addition to have a role in everyday tactics and practice, might have a more strategic role to play in framing risks. Can it be so that their relative absence and silence in the contract is calculated?